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With the exception of 1988, the last ten years have seen a steady
increase in the number of hangings in South Africa. Public concern
about this trend is reflected in the relaunch last November of the
Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa and the
issue has been highlighted by the controversy surrounding cases such
as that of the 'Sharpeville Six'.1 In spite of this, information concern-
ing the imposition of the death penalty is difficult to obtain and
researchers generally must rely on the rather limited information
supplied by the Department of Justice. Consequently, a survey of all
criminal cases heard by the Cape Provincial Division (CPD) of the
Supreme Court between 1 January 1986 and 31 December 19882 was
conducted. The main aim of this research was to identify problematic
• This research was funded in part by the Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in
South Africa. We would like to thank John Butler and Catherine Maxwell who carried out the
research in the Cape Supreme Court and compiled the statistics. In addition we are indebted
to Geoff Budlender, Desiree Hansson, Etienne Mureinik, Nico Steyter and Dirk van Zyl Smit
for their constructive criticism, and the staff of the Cape Supreme Court for facilitating
the research.
** BA LLB (Stellenbosch) LLM (Michigan), Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of
Cape Town.
BA LLB (Stellenbosch) LLM (Cape Town), Lecturer in Criminal and Procedural Law, Univer-
sity of Cape Town.
• BA(Hons) MA (Cape Town), Junior Research Fellow, Department of Psychology, University
of Cape Town.
I An example of the continuing criticism is the resolution passed at the Conference of Law
Teachers in January 1989 calling for the appointment of a judicial inquiry into the death
penalty in South Africa and a moratorium on all pending executions.
2 The statistics reflect the position on 3 February 1989. Excluded from this study, therefore, are
those cases which were missing or incomplete on that date (namely 1/86, 52/86, 55/86, 151/86,
199/86, 278/86, 346/86, 62/87, 112/87, 126/87, 219/87, 257/87, 270/87, 274/87, 61/88, 81/88, 105/88,
113/88, 115/88, 138/88, 154/88, 169/88, 175/88, 189/88, 198/88, 199/88, 200/88, 202/88, 216/88,
217/88, 219/88, 221/88-225/88, 227/88-232/88, 242/88, and any subsequent to 243/88). These
were presumably either still being heard by the trial court or were at some stage in the appeal
process. Where the files were available, albeit incomplete (particularly concerning appeals), as
much information as was obtainable has been included. Cases which were begun in 1985 and
decided in 1986 or subsequently do not fall within the ambit of our research.
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areas in the process leading to judicial execution. To illuminate this
process the study focused on the frequency with which different
judges impose the death" penalty. Information was also collected
concerning the number of discretionary death sentences that were
imposed, and by whom, and statistics relating to appeals and
reprieves were collated.
This article presents the data that we collected in four tables. These
are explained in the first section below. The second part of the article
examines three issues that emerge from the data. First, we note the
disparity in the use of the death penalty by individual judges and
argue that, in part at least, this must be attributed to the personal
disposition of judges. Then we examine the figures relating to appeal
procedures and conclude that the procedure should be reformed.
Thirdly we comment on the reprieve process. The last section of the
article suggests areas in which future research on the death penalty
may fruitfully be conducted.
DESCRIPTION OF THIS STUDY
Table A reflects the total number of criminal cases tried in the CPD
and how many of these were decided by each judge. These totals
include cases in which there was an acquittal, cases in which there
was a finding on a lesser charge, and cases in which a sentence other
than the death sentence was imposed.' The number of accused
persons sentenced to death by each judge is also indicated in this
table, as is the overall total for the CPD.
Virtually all of the criminal cases that come before the Cape
Supreme Court for trial are cases in which the death penalty is a
competent sentence. For example, of 214 completed cases from 1988
included in our survey, all but one are cases in which the death
penalty was a competent sentence. Table A indicates which judges did
not sit for the full period under review, but neither temporary absen-
ces from the bench nor the availability of a judge to preside in
criminal cases is considered. For example, we do not indicate when a
judge may have presided in a long trial, many civil trials or a commis-
sion of inquiry. Because we assess death sentences handed down in
relation to the number of criminal cases a judge has heard, these
factors do not affect our findings.
Our material might have been presented in a variety of different
ways. For instance, acquittals could have been excluded from the
reckoning or the number of cases in which murder with extenuating
circumstances was found juxtaposed with cases in which murder
without extenuating circumstances was the verdict. Culpable
homicide convictions could also have been enumerated. However, we
3 Therefore, obviously, those cases in which all charges were withdrawn by the state or in which
the accused absconded have not been included because, since the judge came to no verdict,
they are irrelevant for the purposes of this study.
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do not purport to examine the multitude of reasons which may lead to
a culpable homicide conviction, a finding of extenuating circum-
stances, a conviction for assault or an acquittal. In each of these cases
a judicial choice is exercised and in each it is likely that the attitude of
the judge to the death sentence itself may be relevant. 4
Table B accounts for each judge named in Table A, i e both the
judges who handed down death sentences and those who did not. It
details the relationship between the number of accused that a judge
has sentenced to death and his or her case load. Column 1 reflects the
percentage of cases (out of 803) that each judge adjudicated, and this
is used to calculate the expected number of cases that would have
been heard by each judge had an equal allocation taken place (see
note below Table B). Column 2 shows the expected number of
accused that each judge would have sentenced to death, relative to his
or her case load, all other things being equal. (This figure is based on
the figure of 120 accused who were sentenced to death and on the
proportion of cases that each judge heard.) Column 3 reflects the
actual number of accused sentenced to death by each judge.
A comparison between columns 2 and 3 (which relate to numbers
of accused sentenced to death) or columns 4 and 5 (which express
these as percentages) indicates that the actual number of accused
sentenced to death relative to each judge's case load differs
considerably from the expected number. For example, if no variables
come into play, Baker J, the first judge on the table, would be expected
to be responsible for 2,24 per cent, or 2,69 of the accused sentenced to
death in our sample, given his case load. He was, in fact, responsible
for 12,5 per cent or 15 accused being sentenced to death. This
represents a difference of 10 per cent or 12 people.
Table C presents information regarding the number of cases each
judge adjudicated in which a death penalty was imposed, and relates
this information to the expected frequency of death penalty cases.
(The data relied on in drawing up this table is contained in Table D.)
Here, then, cases in which the death penalty was imposed are used as
the criterion for assessment, rather than accused sentenced to death,
as in Table B. Column I repeats the percentage of cases that each
judge adjudicated (out of a total of 803), and column 2 calculates the
number of death penalty cases that each judge would be expected to
have tried, given his or her case load and assuming all things were
equal. (Column 4 expresses these figures as a percentage.) Column 3
gives the observed number of death penalty cases that each judge
tried, in other words the number of cases in which one or more death
4 See the text to note 38 for further reference to this issue. It can be argued that in practice there is
an element of discretion even in cases of murder without extenuation (ie mandatory cases)
since the concept of extenuation permits of fairly wide interpretation. It has also been alleged
that judges hand down verdicts of culpable homicide in order to avoid a finding of murder and
the consequent mandatory death sentence (former judge of appeal, Mr Justice Trengove at an
IDASA conference in Cape Town in 1988).
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penalties were imposed. (In column 5 this is expressed as a percentage
of the total number of cases (80) in which the death penalty was
imposed.) The illustrative value of these statistics can be explained
thus: Baker J heard 2,24 per cent of all the cases included in our
sample, and 10 per cent of the death penalty cases. All things being
equal, he would have been expected to have heard 1,8 cases in which
the death penalty was imposed, yet he heard 8 such cases. This
represents a difference of 6 cases.
Column 6 provides a different perspective on judicial sentencing
practices. The figures given here (expressed as percentages) show in
which proportion of the cases heard by each judge death penalties
were imposed. To use the example of Baker J again, the death penalty
was imposed in 44 per cent of the cases that he heard.
Tables B and C provide two different ways of assessing the
frequency with which different judges use capital punishment, as
Table B indicates the number of accused sentenced to death and
Table C the number of cases in which the death penalty was handed
down. A third possible way of comparing the frequency with which
judges use capital punishment would involve assessing the total
number of potential opportunities for handing down the death
sentence each judge had, and measuring this against the actual
number of death sentences. A rough method of doing this would
consider the number of accused appearing before each judge and the
number of resulting death sentences. To be more accurate, the
number of charges for which the death sentence is a competent
verdict would have to be calculated and then measured against death
sentences. In this way full cognisance would be taken of both cases
involving multiple accused and those involving multiple charges.
A number of factors led us to omit this method of comparison.
First, it is clear from the results of Tables B and C that the essential
conclusions that may be drawn from the one are corroborated by the
other. Table B indicates that for most judges there is a disparity
between the expected number of accused sentenced to death relative
to his or her case load, and the actual number of accused sentenced to
death. In some instances, the observed number of accused sentenced
to death is higher than the expected number of accused sentenced to
death, in others the reverse position obtains. Where the observed
number is higher than the expected number, the figures for Lategan,
Baker, Williamson, Van den Heever and Nel JJ show the greatest
disparity. Table C, which analyses the imposition of the death
sentence by comparing death sentence cases to case load, reveals
similar disparities in observed and expected frequencies of death
penalty cases for the same judges.
Secondly, a survey of our material suggests that the spread of multi-
ple accused and multiple charges is fairly even. In other words, while
there are a handful of cases in which one judge handed down a
SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
number of death sentences either upon the same accused or a number
of accused, there are many cases in which none or only one of a group
of accused was condemned to death or in which, although a number
of capital charges were involved, only one (or none) attracted the
death sentence.'
Finally, a comparison of the third type would involve drawing in a
massive quantity of data. Most cases involve more than one capital
charge, and many, multiple accused. The general concurrence of
results in the two methods tabulated suggests that this third method
would not lead to conclusions sufficiently different to justify its use in
a -preI.mi n ay s Ly naIture. Ac cordingly, we think that Table B
fairly reflects the disparity in death sentencing practices by different
judges, and therefore it is these figures that we use in the remainder of
this paper.
Table D provides a more detailed analysis of the information
obtained, focusing only on those judges who imposed death sentences
during the period in question. In order to facilitate accurate
comparison, the table has been divided into three sections, one relat-
ing to cases, one to accused persons, and one to death sentences. The
totals in the first column, as in Table A, indicate how many criminal
cases were decided by each judge. The second column shows the total
number of cases in which one or more death sentences were imposed.
This is distinguished from the total number of accused who received
the death penalty because more than one accused may be sentenced
to death in a single case. Since each accused may receive several death
sentences (for example, one each for murder, rape and robbery), the
number of death penalty cases must also be distinguished from the
total number of death sentences imposed by each judge (see column
8). Case 220/86 exemplifies these distinctions: of the two accused
sentenced to death, the first received two death sentences (for murder
without extenuating circumstances and rape) and the second, one
death sentence (for rape).
Column 9 tabulates discretionary death sentences. While the death
penalty is mandatory in certain circumstances, it is discretionary in
others. Under s 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act,6 a judge is obliged
to impose the death penalty in any case where the accused has been
convicted of murder. There are three exceptions to this provision, the
5 A comparison between columns 2 and 3 of Table D may suggest that, in certain instances, the
presence of many accused who are sentenced to death in one case spuriously inflates the
disparity between the number of accused that a judge could be expected to have sentenced to
death, relative to his or her case load, and the actual number sentenced to death. There are, for
instance, cases in which six or seven accused received the death sentence (see case 159/86). It
may be alleged that the circumstances of such cases (for example, a prison gang murder)
inevitably attract multiple death sentences and that such a feature distorts the statistics. We do
not intend to address the substance of this argument (which we believe is unfounded) here, but
would point out that the method employed in examining disparity in sentencing practices in
Table C neutralizes the effect of multiple death sentences in individual cases.
6 Act 51 of 1977.
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most important being that if extenuating circumstances are proved to
have been present the imposition of the death sentence becomes
discretionary rather than mandatbry. There are also several other
crimes (for example, rape, robbery, housebreaking) for which the
death penalty is a competent, but not mandatory, sentence. The
discretionary death sentences shown in the table are, therefore, those
imposed for the commission of crimes other than 'murder without
extenuation'. These are significant because the judge is not under any
legal obligation to impose such a sentence but chooses to do so (for
example, he may find extenuating circumstances and yet still hand
down a death sentence). For this reason, the total number of
discretionary death sentences imposed by each judge is included in
the table, with more detailed information in the notes. Discretionary
death sentences are often found in combination with mandatory ones.
For example, an accused may be convicted of murder, for which no
extenuating circumstances are found, and in addition convicted of
rape. In such a case, the accused would be executed even if the judge
had not imposed an additional discretionary death sentence. In the
next column we indicate those discretionary death sentences which
were not accompanied by a mandatory death sentence imposed on the
same accused in the same case. In these cases, then, the accused
would not be executed but for the discretionary sentence of the
judge.
There is no automatic right of appeal against a decision of the
Supreme Court. An accused who wishes to appeal against his convic-
fion or sentence must apply to the court which heard his case for leave
to do so. The 'applications pending' column represents those instan-
ces where there was, during the period in which our research was
conducted, no indication of application for leave to appeal. The trial
court grants leave to appeal if there is a reasonable possibility that
another court could come to a different conclusion.7 If the trial court
refuses to grant leave to appeal (as happens in the majority of cases),
the accused's next option is to petition the Chief Justice for leave to
appeal. If leave to appeal is granted, whether by the trial court or by
the Chief Justice, the appeal is heard by the Appellate Division,'
which may confirm the decision of the trial court, overturn the convic-
tion or reduce the sentence.9 The 'outcome pending' column indicates
those cases in which the legal process has not run its full course (i e
the result of an application, petition or appeal was not available), and
these accused were presumably still on death row when our research
was completed.
7 See s 316(3) ofthe Criminal Procedure Act and E Du Toil, F J De Jager, A Paizes, A St Q Skeen
and S Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (1987) 31-9.
8 Because the death penalty is imposed, the appeal goes directly to the Appellate Division and
not, as in other appeals from the Supreme Court, to a full bench of the Supreme Court.
9 See, generally, ss 315, 316 and 322 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
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Once all the judicial options have been exhausted, 0 there is still the
chance that the State President may exercise his prerogative and grant
the accused a reprieve. Although there is no statutory procedure
regulating reprieves, the practice is that the State President receives
reports from both the Attorney-General's office and the presiding
judge. A report from defence counsel may also be included. In
addition, legal advisers in the Department of Justice may be required
to investigate the case."
The total number of reprieves granted thus far in the surveyed cases
within the period considered (ie until 3 February 1989) is reflected in
the table, with additional information in the notes regarding the
individuals who were reprieved. Of those still on death row when our
data was collected, some were awaiting the outcome of a pending case,
others were awaiting a possible reprieve and the remainder, to whom
the State President had, declined to grant a reprieve, were
awaiting execution.
COMMENT
In the introduction to this article we indicate that the research project
was designed to collect empirical information about capital cases in
order to identify possible future areas of research, and to assess where
to expect problems. We return to this goal in the next section, where
we outline further issues that merit attention. Below we address some
preliminary issues that were clearly raised by the survey.
Frequency of the Imposition of the Death Penalty
Tables B, C and D indicate statistically significant 2 disparities in the
use of capital punishment by individual judges for case load. To illus-
trate, Baker J handed down the death penalty in 44 per cent of the
criminal cases that he heard, while King J did not sentence an
accused to death in any one of his 32 cases.
Three judges (Baker J, Lategan J and Williamson J) heard only 15
per cent of the cases among them, yet they sentenced to death 51 per
cent of the accused in our sample. On the other hand, another group
of three judges who did impose the death penalty (Marais J,
Munnik JP and Rose Innes J) sentenced only 12 per cent of the
condemned people, while they tried 32 per cent of the criminal cases.
Both these illustrative statistics and the difference between the actual
number of accused sentenced to death and the expected number for
case load (recorded in columns 2 and 3 of Table B) show that the
10 We have summarized only the usual procedure; there are other exceptional judicial options
available (for example, the Criminal Procedure Act s 316(1) and (3) (application to lead new
evidence) and s323 (appeal by the Minister on behalf of the person sentenced to
death)).
II Section 326 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and see P Yutar The Office of the Attorney General
in South Africa' (1977) 1 SACC 135.
12 See note 2. to Table B.
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disparities in death sentences handed down cannot be due to the
uneven numerical distribution of criminal cases among individual
judges.3
An obvious explanation for the disparity in the imposition of death
sentences would be that some judges favour capital punishment while
others do not. We believe that a judge's personal predisposition to the
imposition of capital punishment does indeed play a crucial role in
explaining our statistics. This is an issue to which we return later in this
article. There is, however, a preliminary question which might be raised
as a response to our figures. It could be alleged that some judges are
routinely assigned to cases where the death penalty is more probable,
while their brethren are allocated less serious trials. This would imply
that some judges receive a far larger proportion of cases to try where the
death penalty is likely. There is some evidence that differential alloca-
tion of trials has taken place in political cases, 4 and it was mentioned
informally in the course of our research by court personnel that a
similar process takes place in 'ordinary' criminal trials.
In provincial divisions of the Supreme Court the roll is organized
by the Judge President and currently the criteria which operate in the
allocation of criminal trials are obscure. But, unless allocation occurs
according to a procedure which can be openly assessed, it must be
rejected. An examination of three very different possible forms of
allocation substantiates this point. Let us take what may to some seem
to be the most benign form of allocation, the form most likely to
appeal to abolitionists. Assume that cases are allocated on the basis of
compassion, that the Judge President benevolently isolates cases that
he believes, or is advised, are most likely to attract the death penalty,
and allocates them to judges who (he believes) are reluctant to impose
the death penalty. Would this system of allocation appease
abolitionists or satisfy lawyers? The answer must be 'No'.
A decision by the Judge President that severe cases should go to
compassionate judges involves the uncontrolled determination of two
factors that are vague, imprecise and irrelevant. It necessarily means
that by some private process the Judge President intervenes in
advance to influence the outcome of a trial. This procedure can be no
more acceptable than its opposite, a second possible form of alloca-
tion, where the Judge President deliberately gives those cases that he
believes are most severe to judges who he thinks are more disposed
to handing down death sentences. 5 Any system which permits the
13 See M C J Olmesdahl 'Predicting the death sentence' in M C J Olmesdahl and N C Steytler
(eds) Criminal Justice in South Africa (1983) 191 at 197 for a similar finding.
14 See John Dugard 'The Judiciary and National Security' (1982) 84 SAI. 655, where it is argued
that such allocation takes place in the Transvaal Provincial Division. See, too, the Commission
of Inquiry into the Structure and Functioning of the Courts (the Hoexter Commission) (RP 78/1983)
at para 1.3.8.
15 This form of allocation would raise problems analogous to those before the American Supreme
Court in Witherspoon v Illinois 391 US 510 (1968). In this case the court upheld the argument that
the practice ofchallenging and excluding prospective jurors in death penalty cases where those
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unrestrained manipulation of such factors cannot be condoned. It
undermines the fundamental principle of equality before the law.
This value is embodied, for instance, in Art 101 1 2 of the German
Fundamental Law (Grundgesetz), which provides that the allocation
of judges to cases should be determined objectively in advance. It is
seen to be an essential part of the administration of justice that
appointments to preside should not be discretionary. The mode of
allocation of judges to cases must be determined by a statute or open
set of rules of general application. An arrangement such as ours
which permits the Judge President to choose which judge should
.. plu in a particular case would be unconstitutional.
A third form of allocation which involves setting aside cases
believed to be severe for trial by particular judges would involve
choosing judges on the basis of seniority or expertise. On the face of it,
this may appear to be an acceptable process. However, in the CPD
allocation of death penalty cases does not occur on the basis of
seniority. According to Table A the judges who handed down the most
death sentences between 1986 and 1988, and who thus might be
argued to have heard more serious cases, were Baker J, Lategan J, Van
den Heever J and Williamson J. While Van den Heever and Baker JJ
were of the more senior judges on the Cape Bench during the period
we reviewed (Van den Heever J was first appointed to the Northern
Cape bench in 1969 and Baker J to the Cape bench in 1973), many
judges have sat for longer than both Lategan and Williamson JJ.
We cannot refute empirically the suggestion that judges who preside
in death penalty cases are assigned cases on the basis of their greater
expertise in criminal matters. Nevertheless, this form of allocation is no
more acceptable than the other possibilities we have discussed. The
notion that certain judges have greater expertise in criminal law matters
is questionable. 16 While it may be true that many newly appointed
judges have had little or no criminal practice in their last years at the
bar, their judicial function requires a vast amount of criminal work,
particularly dealing with cases on review from magistrates' courts.
Judges cannot avoid criminal matters and the structure of the judicial
office suggests that criminal work cannot be considered specialist work.
Moreover, the disposal of most criminal matters, whether they are
'severe' murder cases or deal with 'less serious' offences, depends
heavily upon the assessment of credibility and the evaluation of
evidence, a function central to any judicial officer's work.
jurors admit to having scruples about capital punishment is unconstitutional. Such automatic
challenge results in a biased penalty determination process since an accused is sentenced by a
'death-qualified' jury rather than one drawn from a representative sample of the community.
This violates the due process requirement in the American constitution.
16 We would take issue with Adrienne van Blerk Judge and be Judged (1988) 88 who maintains that
'[alssignment of judges according to expertise, or to achieve an equal distribution of work and,
where possible, as a general rule in contentious cases according to seniority, seems to be a satis-
factory way of manning (sic) a Bench'. The 'truism' she refers to (at 61) that 'not only must
justice be done; it must also palpably be seen to be done' seems appropriate.
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Linked to this objection is the problem raised previously in the
context of compassionate allocation. There is no formal process by
which allocation on the basis of expertise could take place. It would
depend entirely on the opinion of the Judge President. Furthermore,
singling out death penalty cases for trial by particular judges cannot
be compared to a process whereby complicated tax or patent cases are
heard only by judges with special knowledge in the field. Not only is
an argument based on expertise inapposite in the context of criminal
trials, but the issues involved in the death penalty itself make it
inappropriate to limit such trials for hearing by a handful of judges.
Death penalty cases, like political cases, are inevitably controversial.
Indeed, it would be extraordinary if there were no controversy in the
imposition of the death sentence which is a morally problematic
penalty.
In the context of political trials, Sydney Kentridge has warned that
'there ought never to be the slightest suspicion that the courts are
being manipulated'. 7 Without clear criteria which can be discussed
both in the profession and in public, putting aside apparently severe
cases for trial by judges chosen by the Judge President for unknown
reasons cannot be accepted.
Any system of discretionary allocation is inappropriate in capital
trials. Nevertheless, the concerns that the tabulated statistics raise
about the imposition of the death penalty in the Cape Provincial
Division are unlikely to be fully addressed by simply ending whatever
system of allocation may exist. To account for the wide disparity in
the number of death sentences handed down by different judges
revealed in our survey, other factors must also be taken into
account.
Variables relating to the accused and the crime such as race, the age
of the accused and victim, and the severity and place of the crime,
influence the outcome of a capital case. In public and academic
discourse, these sorts of factors are frequently asserted to be pre-
eminent in explaining differences between individual sentences. The
conventional wisdom is that on account of the infinite variety of
individual circumstances which constitute each case, sentences
cannot be compared. As Nicholas J has noted, '[a] comparison
between cases is fallible because "appropriate punishment depends so
largely upon the particular circumstances of the case and upon the
particular circumstances of the accused concerned..." (per Ogilvie
Thompson JA in S v Berliner 1967 (2) SA 193 (A))'. 8 Nicholas J is
constrained to indicate another factor relevant in sentencing, namely
that the matter is one of an exercise of discretion and in such matters
reasonable men may differ. The general aim of 'consistency and
17 'Telling the Truth about the Law' (1982) 99 SAL. 648 at 653.
18 'The Courts-Disparity in Sentencing: Consistency and Discretion-are they reconcilable?'
(1972) 1 Crime Punishment and Correction 22 at 26.
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fairness' in punishment, while usually mentioned by commentators, is
implicitly held to be subservient to both the individual circumstances
of each case and a free exercise of discretion. 9
Excessive emphasis on the multitude of individual factors differen-
tiating case from case obscures an important factor in sentencing,
namely the disposition of the adjudicator, and reduces the general
aim of consistency and fairness to mere rhetoric. Any serious attempt
to maintain fairness in sentencing must acknowledge that judicial
disposition influences sentencing.20 In his seminal work on sentenc-
ing, Hogarth found that the individual penal philosophy of a magis-
trate is consistently reflected in the pattern of sentencing decisions by
that magistrate.' Magistrates' sentences are often consistent within
themselves, yet inconsistent with one another's sentences. Personal
sentencing philosophy would of course be reflected in the sentencing
practices of judges too, and personal views in connection with capital
punishment necessarily play a greater role in the decision whether or
not to impose this punishment than, say, a choice between two other
forms of punishment. As Mr Justice Leon, former judge in Natal,
points out, 'I know from my own experience that some judges find
extenuating circumstances more easily than others. I know judges
who impose the death sentence not infrequently, and I know one
judge who has been on the bench for some years who has never
passed the death sentence.'2 It is well known that some judges are
strongly opposed to the death sentence while others defend its role as
a punishment.
Although few judges have publicly committed themselves while
they are still on the Bench, Mr Justice Didcott has spoken out in
favour of abolition of the death penalty.23 Conversely, David Bruck's
research 24 suggests that Mr Justice Kriek and Mr Justice Munnik view
the death sentence as an appropriate penalty. Other judges have on
19 See, in general, S v Holder 1979 (2) SA 70 (A) and S v Pieters 1987 (3) SA 717 (A). This issue is
discussed in John Dugard Training Needs in Sentencing' (1985) 1 SAJHR 93, J R Lund 'Discre-
tion, principles and precedent in sentencing (part one)' (1979) 3 SACC 203 and J R Lund
'Consistency as a principle of sentencing' (1983) 7 SACC 3.
20 The allegation that sentencing practice in death penalty cases is affected by the personal
attitudes of the presiding judge is one of the issues considered by Olmesdahl in a study of death
sentences in the Durban and Coast Local Division between 1970 and 1979 (M C J Olmesdahl,
op cit note 13). Olmesdahl concludes that the individual judge's role in hearing a matter does
not explain significant variance in the imposition of the death penalty when certain other
extenuating and aggravating factors are taken into account. However, there are methodological
problems with Olmesdahl's research and his conclusions are not reliable. This issue is dealt
with in the Appendix on page 171.
21 J Hogarth Sentencing as a Human Process (1971) especially chapters 5, 6 and 7.
22 (1989) 106 SALJ 42 at 47.
23 J M Didcott 'Should the Death Penalty be Abolished' (1980)4 SACC 298. See also Ellison Kahn
'The Death Penalty in South Africa' (1970) 33 THRHR 108 at 122-3, who adds Justices
Hiemstra, Cloete, Maritz and Krause to the list.
24 David Bruck 'On Death Row in Pretoria Central' 13 and 20 July 1987 TheNew Republic 18 at 21.
It is also arguable that the readiness of the trial judge in S v S 1987 (2) SA 307 (A) (Lategan J) to
hand down the death sentence where he perceived the prison system to malfunction indicates a
favouring of capital punishment.
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occasion revealed this attitude towards capital punishment privately,
or during the course of a trial.
Whatever other factors may contribute to the wide disparities that
our research reveals, we cannot ignore the wealth of evidence from
judges and researchers alike that personal views on penal policy are
an important factor in explaining differing sentences. 5
The influence of personal philosophy is more particularly relevant
when the death sentence is imposed in the exercise of a 'free' discre-
tion to do so (for example for rape, robbery or murder with extenuat-
ing circumstances). Although the notion of moral blameworthiness
inherent in the legal interpretation that has attached to s 277 of the
Criminal Procedure Act is one that permits of a difference of
opinion,26 the factors which may validly constitute reduced moral
blameworthiness are to some extent circumscribed.2 This constraint
does not apply when a purely discretionary death sentence is imposed
and, therefore, discretionary sentences are undoubtedly reflective to a
larger extent of the personal penal philosophy of the adjudicator. Our
statistics reveal that sixteen of the eighteen discretionary death sen-
tences were imposed by only two judges (Lategan J handed down ten
and Munnik JP six).
Leave to Appeal
Table D indicates that in only a limited number of cases does the trial
judge give leave to appeal (in 40 out of 120 completed hearings in our
sample). Moreover, the tendency of a judicial officer to grant leave to
appeal ranges from 0 per cent (Baker J) to 63 per cent (Lategan J).E8 In
even fewer instances does the Chief Justice grant this right. Although
the number of cases in which the death sentence is overturned is not
high (8 out of 31 appeals in our sample), this occurs frequently
enough for a condemned person to have a right to have his or her
sentence reconsidered.? The present system, whereby leave to appeal
must first be sought from the trial judge, and if he or she refuses, a
petition may be addressed to the Chief Justice seeking leave to appeal,
does not seem to provide sufficient safeguards. In a number of cases
.no petition at all was addressed to the Chief Justice.30 This may be
because the accused's legal representative had no confidence in the
prospect of success but could also be due to the inexperience of
25 While Hogarth's study (op cit note 21) is the most important, see also Roger Hood and Richard
Sparks Key Issues in Criminology (1970) chapter 5, and A K Bottomley Decisions in the Penal
Process (1973) chapter 4 for references to material substantiating this point
26 R Leon (1989) 106 SAL 42 at 47.
27 For example, the absence of previous convictions may not be proved.
28 This figure was reached by dividing the number of times trial court judges granted leave to
appeal into the total death sentences imposed and by converting this to a percentage.
29 See also, for example, D van Zyl Smit 'Judicial Discretion and the Sentence of Death
for Murder' (1982) 97 SAL 87 and P J P Coetzee 'Beskouings oor die Doodstraf' (1988) 1
Consultus 15.
30 Cases 118/86, 159/86, 168/86, 314/86, 25/87, 67/87, 212/87, 278/87 and 238/87.
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counsel or mistakes." Furthermore research suggests that there are
cases in which the accused is successful on appeal in spite of a refusal
by the trial judge to grant leave to appeal.
32
While the defence system in capital cases is staffed by inexper-
ienced pro deo counsel,'as it is at present, we cannot lend our voice of
support to calls for an automatic right to appeal. The true nature of the
remedy should be an automatic appeal procedure, which need not
solely depend on the vigilance and enthusiasm of the pro deo counsel.
Such a procedure may be likened to a form of automatic review and
needs to be carefully constructed to address existing problems.
Reprieves
From 1984 to 1987 the number of reprieves expressed as a proportion
of the number of people executed showed a steady decline.3 In 1986
and 1987, for example, statistics compiled from the number of
reprieves and executions for South Africa (excluding Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) indicate that that ratio was 7:1,
ie 285 executions and 42 reprieves. In 1988 there was a sudden and
dramatic change in these ratios, as 117 people were executed and 49
reprieved. This approximates a proportion of 3:1. By 31 May, 37
people had been reprieved during 1989, while the number that had
thus far been executed was 26. (This increase has not dramatically
altered the reprieve figures that we provide in column 5 of Table D. By
31 May, only 2 further reprieves pertained to cases included in our
study.) It seems that there has for the moment been a re-evaluation of
policy regarding the granting of clemency by the executive. It is proba-
ble too that these changes have been influenced by the political
climate regarding executions of people sentenced to death for 'unrest
related' offences. However, while the reprieve process remains secret,
and since no explanations are provided when executive clemency is
granted or refused, it is difficult to establish the reasons for the recent
increase in the number of reprieves conclusively.
Clearly reprieves are the prerogative of the executive and are not
directly related to judicial activity. Yet the confidential judge's report
that is forwarded to the executive for consideration may influence the
reprieve process. It has been persuasively suggested that this report
has a significant role to play in the deliberations of the executive.Y4 No
judge has, to our knowledge, commented publicly upon this aspect of
judicial activity. Little is known, therefore, about the scope and
complexity of these reports. Du Toit asserts, however, that the ambit of
31 This occurred in the case of Isak Tshongoyi whose petition to the Chief Justice for leave
to appeal was misfiled. The error was discovered on the eve of his execution (Cape lmes
25 November 1988).
32 Case 67/87, for example.
33 Christina Murray and Julia Sloth-Nielsen 'Hangings in Southern Africa: The Last Ten Years'
(1988) 4 SAJHR 391.
34 E Du Toit Straf in Suid-Aftika (1981) 507.
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the report is not confined to issues related to the trial, but that the
judge is afforded an opportunity of expressing his or her informal
views about the impending execution. 5 Clearly, then, the judge's
personal predisposition concerning capital punishment will influence
the formulation of his or her recommendation.
In addition, judges may hold divergent views about their role in the
reprieve process itself. This, too, may determine the nature of their
submissions to the executive. David Bruck's research illustrates
the problem:
'The Durban judge ... told me that, on occasion, he had even imposed death sen-
tences merely to frighten local criminals, while fully intending to write to the Minis-
try of Justice to recommend clemency. He didn't know whether these death sentences
had actually been commuted. He felt sure they had been, but he'd never inquired. (If
he had, he might have been surprised. The judge had informed me that the state
president commutes about 80 per cent of the death sentences every year, but the
actual commutation rate last year was just 15 per cent, less than a fifth of
what he believed.)'
36
FUTURE RESEARCH IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
The goals of the research documented in this article were limited, but
the project has provided important pointers to areas which require
further, more detailed, investigation. Those areas which, in our
opinion, require urgent attention are outlined here. First, however, it is
important to note a very basic constraint operating upon those
researchers who might wish to implement these suggestions. In very
few Supreme Court cases are typed records of either the trial or the
judgment available. The proceedings of cases in which the death
penalty is imposed are transcribed, but this seldom occurs in other
instances. This means that the primary research material relating to
the proven facts of cases where, for example, extenuating circum-
stances were found to be present, is difficult to procure. Obviously any
detailed study would therefore require substantial funding in order to
transcribe untyped records, before any further collation and analysis
could be tackled. Were such a task to be undertaken, the material we
examined in the course of this research indicates that the following
matters should be given priority.37
1. Discretion in Conviction
The range of competent convictions on a charge of murder gives
judges an unusually wide discretion relating to verdict. The
commonly-held notion that death penalty cases involve more serious
factual situations neglects the consideration that similarly gruesome
facts are to be found in any number of Supreme Court trials where the
35 Du Toit loc cit.
36 See note 24 at 20.
37 The suggestions that follow are based to a significant extent on observations made while
collecting the data reproduced in this article.
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death penalty is not imposed. Any comparison of cases which pur-
ported to explore the exercise of judicial discretion in relation to the
death penalty would have to explain the possible variance between
judges in findings relating to the presence or absence of extenuating
circumstances. (This may require investigating not only judgments on
the question of extenuation but also the adequacy and scope of the
defence evidence presented on extenuation. We note with concern
that our research suggests that often little evidence is led by the
defence on the issue.) But it is not only in the finding on extenuation
that judicial discretion is an issue. In addition, a study illuminating
j~n 
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consider culpable homicide convictions, since this verdict may be
used as a device to avoid hangings. 8 Furthermore, we observed that a
proportion, albeit small, of murder charges results in a conviction for
assault. A comprehensive study of such cases might elucidate whether
these verdicts too are used by the judiciary to avoid hangings. Lastly,
acquittals cannot be left out of the reckoning. Ten per cent of the cases
in our sample resulted in acquittals on all charges. It is possible that
in cases where the death penalty is in issue some judges may be more
than usually zealous in their application of the burden of proof.
2. Discretionary Death Sentences
Cases where the death sentence is not mandatory warrant separate
consideration because here the sentencing discretion is not concealed
by the formal issue of whether or not extenuating circumstances are
present. An independent analysis of these cases might further our
understanding of the way in which such sentencing decisions are
made. This is more particularly urgent since the Minister of Justice
has recently suggested that the government is considering enacting
legal provisions abolishing mandatory death sentences.
3. Issues concerning the Application of the Concept 'Extenuating
Circumstances'
(i) It appears that death sentences are frequently imposed on
youthful offenders. Some are between the ages of 18 and 21. In S v
Lehnberg3 9 it was held that youth was prima facie an extenuating
circumstance unless the murder was committed by reason of 'inner
vice'. We suspect from a cursory examination of cases involving
youths (for example cases 36/87, 131/87, 245/87 and 87/88) that
judges apply widely differing approaches to the consideration of
youth as a factor in extenuation. These cases are seldom reported,
which means that an important aspect of the law relating to
extenuating circumstances may be developing unsystematically
and without academic scrutiny.
38 See note 4 above.
39 1975 (4) SA 553 (A).
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(ii) As noted above, it is apparent that in many cases little evidence
is led in extenuation. The use of witnesses, including expert
witnesses, requires investigation. For instance, it is possible that the
introduction of reports by social workers, the testimony of
psychologists and expert criminological evidence may play a deter-
mining role in the finding that extenuating circumstances are
present.4 Judicial activism in this context may also be considered.
To what extent do (or should) judges call for such evidence where
counsel do not offer it?
(iii) It is axiomatic that women are treated differently from men in
the criminal justice system. Common parlance has it that women
are seldom hanged, for example. However, we noted at least two
instances of women sentenced to death.41 We also noted many other
instances in which women were convicted and given lesser senten-
ces. Further research directed at examining prosecutions of women
in the Supreme Court may well expand our understanding of
judicial perceptions relating to women and the relationship of this
to the finding of extenuating (or mitigating) factors.
42
4. Appeal Procedure
As we point out above43 the absence of an automatic appeal procedure
is a serious defect in our system. It is a matter which requires urgent
attention from both researchers who might indicate methods of
addressing the problem, and the legislature.
5. Reprieves
The broad outlines of the reprieve process have been officially
documented" but details remain obscure. Yutar's assertion that 'no
stone is left unturned in order to ensure that no miscarriage of justice
results' 45 does not allay our disquiet that cases exist in which mitigat-
ing factors do not come to light. This concern is at least in part
predicated upon the limited evidence in extenuation that is presented
in many capital cases by pro deo counsel. Whether State machinery
can supplant the role of a competent defence counsel when it inves-
tigates an accused's claim for a reprieve is questionable. Nevertheless,
executive action through granting reprieves is central to the scheme in
South Africa and investigation is necessary to assure us that the
40 See Inside South Africa's Death Factory Black Sash (1989) 55-6.
41 These were Victoria Gwe (case 67/87), and Sandra Smith (case 325/86). Both were tried with
men as co-accused. On appeal Gwe was acquitted on the charge for which the death sentence
was imposed. Sandra Smith was executed on 2 June 1989.
42 It may be interesting, too, to consider the position of women as victims of crime in Supreme
Court prosecutions. Our attention was attracted to this issue by the widely divergent results in
successful rape prosecutions. Death sentences were imposed for rape (for example, S v Pietersen
case 114/88), yet a sentence of nine months was also noted.
43 See text to note 29.
44 Lansdown Report of Penal and Prison Reform UG 47 of 1947 para 466.
45 Op cit note II at 141.
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mechanisms and structure of the process provide sufficient
safeguards.
6. Counsel, Prosecutors, Interpreters and Assessors
While our primary interest is the role of judicial disposition in impos-
ing the death sentence, our research suggestions include references to
the much criticized pro deo system of defence in capital trials. It is
clear that future research should continue to highlight the inade-
quacies of the structure of legal representation in criminal trials in the
Supreme Court. In addition, the respective roles of prosecutors, inter-
nreteprs% nn1 aessors i the. cases desenms .... analysis.
CONCLUSION
The matters raised in the previous section require detailed considera-
tion and we believe that empirical data and comprehensive statistical
information will provide important insights into current problems in
capital cases. Indeed, any substantial analysis of sentencing patterns
in Supreme Court trials cannot but extend our understanding of penal
policy and the judicial process. We consider, though, that many of the
issues raised above should not be addressed by statistical methods
alone. For example, the role of interpreters in Supreme Court trials
can be meaningfully assessed only by employing a process-oriented
research methodology. Researchers in South Africa who have used
these methods have delivered important findings on the profound
structural constraints inherent in the process of adjudication in
criminal trials in a multi-racial and multi-lingual society.
4
6
Nevertheless, the outcome of our preliminary research confirms
what many practitioners would regard as self-evident. There are
substantial disparities among judges in handing down death sen-
tences. It is possible that some disparity is explained by the
differential allocation of trials to judges by the Judge President. It is
clear too, though, that personal penal philosophies also inform the
decision to sentence a person to death. We would argue that the
disparity in death sentences for case load amongst CPD judges is
itself disturbing enough to raise serious doubts about the fairness of
the system. It can never be accepted in a moral legal system that
whether an accused lives or dies depends on the judge before whom
he or she is tried.
46 See N C Steytler The Undefended Accused on Trial (1988) and D Hansson Differences in the
comprehensibility of testimony: a comparative study of magistrates' credibility judgment, witnesses'
ethnicity and court role (Unpublished MSocSci dissertation, University of Cape Town
1985).
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APPENDIX
OLMESDAHL AND THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DISPOSITION
IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE
IN SOUTH AFRICA
Olmesdahl, in a recent empirical study of factors contributing to the
imposition of the death penalty in the Durban and Coast Local
Division ('Predicting the death sentence' in M C J Olmesdahl and N C
Steytler (eds) Criminal Justice in South Africa (1982) 191) claims that the
'personal disposition' of the judge makes a relatively negligible
contribution to the decision to impose the death penalty. Olmesdahl's
claim is particularly important as it contradicts our assertion that
judicial disposition does influence sentencing. Moreover, Olmesdahl's
research has recently been used by Adrienne van Blerk in Judge and be
Judged (1988) at 53 to support the proposition that the temperamental
disposition of judges plays no significant role in trials. We will argue
here that the claim is not supported by the empirical evidence, and, in
particular, that it rests on a number of methodologically and statis-
tically indefensible premises. It effectively leaves the question of the
contribution of judicial disposition to decisions regarding the death
penalty unanswered. The most important of our arguments is contained
in section 2 below. The other criticisms are subsidiary if the argument in
section 2 is well-founded.
It is necessary to outline briefly the procedure and method of
analysis used by Olmesdahl in order to demonstrate its limitations.
Olmesdahl, using a method commonly known as 'archival' or 'histori-
cal' research, collected data concerning a large number of relevant
'variables' for each criminal case heard by the Durban and Coast
Local Division of the Supreme Court for the period 1970-1979. (A
prototype of the record sheet that Olmesdahl used to record informa-
tion on is appended to his article.) It should be noted that the only
information relating to 'personal disposition' collected by Olmesdahl
for each case and used in the statistical analysis was the identity of the
judge presiding over the case. Thus, in what follows, 'personal disposi-
tion' refers only to the fact that each case is associated uniquely with
one judge, and not, for example, to 'personality type'.
In a preliminary analysis in which Olmesdahl considers the cases
heard by the entire Natal Provincial Division in 1979, he shows that
the tendency to impose the death penalty varies across judges, some
judges imposing such a sentence more frequently than other judges.
He reflects that this unequal tendency may be explicable in terms of
factors that occur unequally across cases, and should not be taken as
firm evidence of the personal predisposition on the part of some
judges to impose the death penalty. Olmesdahl consequently attempts
to look at the effect of many variables in concert on the decision to
impose the death penalty, one of these variables being the 'personal
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disposition' of the judges. The statistical method chosen in this
attempt is multiple regression analysis, which, it should be noted, is a
relatively sophisticated method. The method may best be charac-
terized as 'actuarial' or 'predictive' in nature: a numerical equation
(usually of the first degree, or power) is generated, in which a number
of numerical variables are weighted and added to each other in such a
manner as to obtain the best prediction of another numerical variable.
Conclusions regarding the causal relationships of variables cannot
usually be made on the basis of multiple regression analysis,
especially when the method of archival analysis is used. Multiple
regression analysis is also not ideally suited to the task of assessing a
particular variable's relative contribution to the predicted variable,
although judicious use of the method does permit an approximate
answer to this question. (Detailed accounts of multiple regression
analysis may be found, in order of complexity, in F N Kerlinger,
Foundations of Behavioral Research (1985); D C Howell, Statistical
Methods for Psychology (1987); N R Draper and H Smith, Applied
Regression Analysis (1981).)
Olmesdahl's statistical analysis of cases concerning the imposition
of the death penalty appears to show that the factors which in
combination are most highly predictive of whether the death penalty
is imposed, are the existence of a theft motive, the presence of pictures
of the deceased in the trial and the existence of an alibi defence,
among others. These variables account, in concert, for 46 per cent of
the variance in the predicted variable (imposition of the death
penalty). (What is meant by 'accounting for 46 per cent of the
variance' is quite technical statistically, and for our purposes may best
be taken as an indication of the predictive accuracy of the composite
equation formed from the predictor variables.) The personal disposi-
tion of the judge, on the other hand, appears to account for only 2 per
cent of the variation in the predicted variable. In other words, once we
have considered other variables of importance, the personal disposi-
tion of the judge is only very weakly related to whether the death
sentence is imposed or not.
Olmesdahl's conclusion on the basis of this analysis is that the
postulated personal predisposition of some judges to impose the death
penalty is not supported by the evidence, and that, on the contrary,
factors unique to judges play little role in death sentencing in the
D&CLD. Buttressed as this claim is by empirical analysis, we think
that it is seriously flawed, which we will presently attempt to
demonstrate.
1. The Method Used to Identify the Relative Contribution of the Judge to
the Sentencing Decision
The first problematic aspect of Olmesdahl's work that we wish to
point to is the way in which he adduces evidence in support of the
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claim that the personal disposition of the judge contributes relatively
little to the sentencing decision. His evidence stems from the multiple
regression analysis, which he seems to think shows that the personal
disposition of the judge accounts for only 2 per cent of the variation in
sentencing decisions. We mentioned earlier that the method of multi-
ple regression analysis is not ideally suited for answering this type of
question, but that approximate solutions to the problem exist. Olmes-
dahl's method does not qualify as one of these solutions. It is not suffi-
cient to examine the amount of variance supposedly explained by the
'personal disposition' variable because the amount that it 'explains'
will depend on the order in which it is entered into the regression
equation (see Kerlinger at 545). This point can be made by using an
analogy. Imagine that we are interested in predicting the amount of
fuel that a car will use. One variable which will be a useful predictor
here will be the size of the engine, measured in cubic centimetres.
Simply expressed, bigger engines tend to use more fuel. (This
relationship is of course imperfect, but certainly quite strong.)
Another variable which will be predictive is the mass of the vehicle.
Heavier cars tend to use more fuel. However, these two 'predictor'
variables are related in turn to each other-bigger engines tend to be
housed in heavier cars. Imagine now that we are interested in the
predictive power of these two variables in concert, and we accordingly
conduct a multiple regression analysis. If we enter the mass of the car
into the analysis first we will find that this mass accounts for a
considerable amount of the variation in fuel consumption across all
the types of cars on the market. If we now enter the size of the engine
into the equation we will find that it accounts for little more of the
variation in fuel consumption. This is because the mass of the car and
the size of the engine are in themselves related and share a degree of
predictive power with respect to fuel consumption. By entering the
mass of the car first we have deprived the engine size of some of its
predictive power. Conversely, if we had entered engine size into the
analysis first we would have found that it explained a substantial
amount of variation in fuel consumption, and mass of the car would
have explained relatively less by virtue of the fact that entering the
engine size has deprived the mass of the car of some of its predictive
power. For this reason it is impossible to identify the relative contribu-
tion of a variable by considering only the degree of variance explained
by the variable in a particular regression equation. One possible
solution is to enter the variable first, and then to repeat the procedure,
entering the same variable last, comparing the amounts of
explanatory variation due to the variable in question in each case. A
better method than this is to calculate the squared 'semi-partial
correlation' of the predictor variable with the predicted variable (ie,
the portion of variance in the predicted variable that the predictor
variable accounts for, the predictor variable being 'purged' of all
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variance that it shares with other predictor variables in the analysis)
(see Howell at 501). Olmesdahl unfortunately pursues neither of these
options in his analysis, and so cannot claim to have identified the
relative contribution of the personal disposition of the judges to the
decision to impose the death sentence. If he had altered the entry of
variables into the regression analysis he may well have found that
'personal disposition' explains considerably more than 2 per cent of
the variation in sentencing decisions.
2. The Coding of the 'Personal Disposition' of the Judge
Multiple regression analysis, as we indicate above, uses numerical
variables to predict other numerical variables. Olmesdahl conse-
quently had to convert much of the information he collected into a
numerical form suitable for analysis. This is usually quite easily
achieved, for example coding sex of the victim as '' for 'male' or '0'
for 'female'. However, the way in which Olmesdahl transformed
the sentencing decision into a numerical variable is extremely
problematic, and seems to us to flaw his analysis profoundly. He
reports that he assigned each judge a dichotomous classification of
'high severity' or 'low severity' and then coded this for numerical
analysis. He arrived at the classification by ranking the judges in
terms of the number of death sentences imposed, assigning each judge
above the median value a 'high severity' classification and each judge
below the median value a 'low severity' classification. (There is some
confusion here with regard to the information that Olmesdahl used to
classify each of the judges. It would appear from his article that he
based this categorization on the entire 1970-1979 period for the
D&CLD. However, in personal communication with him in 1989, he
confirmed that Table 5 covering the entire NPD in 1979 alone was
used for the classification of 'high' and 'low severity' judges. If he
indeed followed this course, then his analysis must have been incom-
plete, since several judges retired during the 1970-1978 period
(Fannin J springs immediately to mind), and he would consequently
have been unable to categorize these judges, and would have had to
have dropped them and the cases they tried from the regression
analysis. Despite this uncertainty, the argument which follows is
applicable whichever approach was adopted.)
It is not difficult to see that Olmesdahl's classificatory procedure is
extremely problematic. In effect it amounts to using a transformed
version of the predicted variable in order to predict itself. Apart from
being logically tautologous, the procedure also seriously violates one
of the statistical assumptions underlying multiple regression analysis,
which is beyond the scope of the discussion here, but has to do with
the independence of the variables used in the analysis. What is
surprising in this context is that the explanatory power of the
'personal disposition' is so low. After all, if you use the severity of a
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judge in order to predict how severe he is, you expect your prediction
to be perfect. This lack of explanatory power can be explained partly
by the fact that Olmesdahl transformed the severity variable from a
continuous scale (number of death penalties imposed) to a
dichotomous scale (high severity or low severity). This transformation
will inevitably result in a substantial loss of explanatory power: a
predictor variable is perfectly predictive in the sense that it 'matches'
the variation in the predicted variable perfectly, and in the present
case this is clearly impossible since the predictor variable can only
take on two values as opposed to the many values that the predicted
variable can take on.
Perhaps the most disconcerting observation here is that the coding
into high and low severity was totally unnecessary insofar as the aim
of the coding was to investigate the predictive power of the 'personal
disposition' of the judges. The conceptualization of 'personal disposi-
tion' used in Olmesdahl's study (theoretically impoverished as it is)
could quite easily have been investigated by simply assigning a
unique number to each judge and by entering this 'identification
variable' into the regression analysis.
3. Amount of Variance Explained by Personal Disposition
We believe that there is enough evidence at this stage to dismiss
Olmesdahl's claim regarding the unimportance of judicial disposition
in the imposition of the death penalty. Nevertheless, there are a
number of other issues which are raised by Olmesdahl's study and
which are generally relevant to any empirical analysis of sentencing
decisions. In the first place, consider Olmesdahl's claim that it is not
sufficient to demonstrate that some judges impose the death sentence
more frequently than others to conclude that judicial disposition
plays a significant role in sentencing decisions. This is true in the
sense that some judges may consistently receive cases in which the
death penalty is more warranted than in cases other judges receive (ie,
where extenuating circumstances are absent). Olmesdahl suggests that
the appropriate analysis is to take the personal disposition of the
judge into account alongside a variety of other factors, and to effec-
tively 'partial out' the contribution that factors other than judicial
disposition make to the sentencing decision. This is correct up to a
point. Olmesdahl surely does not mean that the decision made by the
judge under the hypothesis of 'personal disposition' will be irreduc-
ible; that the decision depends on an inexplicable idiosyncratic
disposition. The hypothesis of 'personal disposition' means that some
judges are imposing the death sentence because they are favourably
disposed to the existence of such a sentence in South African law, or
that some judges are less likely to find extenuating circumstances,
ceteris paribus, or some such situation that is in accord with a
motivational basis. The point is that the unequal tendency of judges to
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impose the death sentence may well be explicable, and it may well be
possible to explicate this tendency by identifying the basis on which
judges are imposing the sentence. This does not nullify the hypothesis
of personal disposition, because it is precisely the unequal sensitivity
of the judges to such factors that leads them to impose the death
sentence with unequal frequency. Take for example Olmesdahl's
purported finding that the presence of photographs in trials is highly
predictive of whether the death sentence is imposed or not. It may well
be that some judges are sensitive to the content of such photographs,
which are often quite gruesome, and that these judges are more likely
to impose the death sentence faced with a photographic depiction of
the gruesome result of the misdemeanour. If it is the case that
photographs have an unequal tendency to appear in criminal trials
then it may well be that it is precisely in those cases where there are
judges who are sensitive to photographs that such photographs make
their appearance (and prosecutors might not be completely innocent
of the unequal tendency of such photographs to appear). If we follow
Olmesdahl's procedure, on the other hand, then we are likely to
partial out the effect due to the presentation of photographs, and
mistakenly conclude that the disposition of the judges bears no
relation to the sentencing decision.
A related point concerns the question of the 'amount of variance'
explained by 'personal disposition'. It will be recalled that one of
Olmesdahl's key assertions is that the personal disposition of judges
in his study accounts for very little of the variation in sentencing
decisions. The point we would like to make here is that it is difficult to
decide how much variation personal disposition has to explain before
it is accorded theoretical significance. (There are statistical tests of
significance in multiple regression analysis, but they answer the
question of departures from random sampling variation only. They
are of little use in deciding on theoretical importance.) It is unreason-
able to expect personal disposition to explain terribly much variation,
because that would mean that sentencing decisions were largely (i e,
for the greater part) determined by judicial idiosyncrasies, which is as
unlikely as it is undesirable. To compound problems, statisticians and
researchers who employ statistical methodologies tend to dismiss
multiple regression equations that account for as much as 50 per cent
of the variation as inadequately explanatory. This is especially the
case where regression equations are employed in situations that they
were devised for, namely for the development of scientifically satisfac-
tory models, where the explanation of a large amount of variation is a
sine qua non, for methodological and not statistical reasons. In the
case we are concerned with, it is highly likely that even relatively
small variations explained by the personal disposition of judges will
be legally interesting.
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CONCLUSION
Olmesdahl's paper cannot seriously be cited in support of the proposi-
tion that the 'personal disposition' of judges is not an important factor
in the imposition of death sentences in South Africa. We have pointed
to many flaws in Olmesdahl's methodology, and wish simply to repeat
the most damning of these, which is that the way in which Olmesdahl
analysed the information regarding 'personal disposition' is tautologi-
cal and methodologically and statistically indefensible.




Judge cases heard to death
Baker ........................... 18 15
Berm an ........................ 13
Burger .......................... 51 6
Com rie ......................... 9 -
Conradie3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  18 1
Cooper2  . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 -
De Kock ....................... 7 -
Fagan ........................... 33 2
Foxcroft3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30 2
Friedm an ...................... 14 1
G riessel2  . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I -
Hoberman 2 . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . 1 -
H odes 2 . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .  5 -
Hofmeyr2 ....................... 3 -
H owie .......................... 26 -
King ........................... 32 -
Lategan ........................ 65 29
M arais ......................... 63 4
M unnik ........................ 102 8
N el ............................ 28 8
Rose Innes ..................... 84 1
Scott2  ......
....................  6 -
Seligson 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
Selikowitz3  . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7 -
Tebbutt ........................ 47 6
Thring
2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 -
Van den Heever ................ 28 13
Van Heerden ................... 36 3
Van Schalkwyk2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15 3
Viljoen 2 . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 -
Vivier' .......................... 3 -
W illiamson ..................... 40 18
803 120
Notes to Table A
I Judges no longer on the Cape bench (ie retired, deceased or appointed to
the Appellate Division).
2 Acting judges who, within the research period, were not appointed
permanently to the bench.
3 Judges who acted for a period and were, within the research period, given
permanent appointments.
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TABLE B
Imposition of the death penalty: analysis of sentencing in terms of accused
ACCUSED SENTENCED TO DEATH*
Percentage
of cases
tried by Expected Observed Expected Observed
Judge judge number number percentage percentage
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5
Baker ..................... 2,24 2,69 15 2,24 12,50
Berman ................... 1,67 2,00 - 1,67 -
Burger ..................... 6,35 7,62 6 6,35 5,00
Comrie .................... 1,12 1,34 - 1,12 -
Conradie .................. 2,24 2,69 1 2,24 0,83
Cooper .................... 0,50 0,60 - 0,50 -
De Kock .................. 0,87 1,04 - 0,87 -
Fagan ..................... 4,11 4,93 2 4,11 1,67
Foxcroft ................... 3,74 4,49 2 3,74 1,67
Friedman .................. 1,75 2,09 1 1,75 0,83
Griessel ................... 0,12 0,14 - 0,12 -
Hoberman ................. 0,12 0,14 - 0,12 -
Hodes ..................... 0,62 0,74 - 0,62 -
Hofmeyr ................... 0,37 0,44 - 0,37 -
Howie ..................... 3,24 3,89 - 3,24 -
King ...................... 3,99 4,79 - 3,99 -
Lategan ................... 8,09 9,71 29 8,09 24,17
Marais .................... 7,85 9,42 4 7,85 3,33
Munnik ................... 12,70 15,20 8 12,70 6,67
Nel ........................ 3,49 4,19 8 3,49 6,67
Rose Innes ................ 10,40 12,50 1 10,40 0,83
Scott ...................... 0,75 0,90 - 0,75 -
Seligson ................... 1,12 1,34 - 1,12 -
Selikowitz ................. 0,87 1,04 - 0,87 -
Tebbutt .................... 5,86 7,03 6 5,86 5
Thring ..................... 0,25 0,30 - 0,25 -
Van den Heever ........... 3,49 4,19 13 3,49 10,83
Van Heerden .............. 4,48 5,37 3 4,48 2,50
Van Schalkwyk ............ 1,87 2,24 3 1,87 2,50
Viljoen .................... 0,37 0,44 - 0,37 -
Vivier ..................... 0,37 0,44 - 0,37 -
Williamson ................ 4,98 5,97 18 4,98 15,00
Notes to Table B
* Calculations are based on the case load of each judge and on the total number of accused sen-
tenced to death.
I The expected percentage of cases allocated if allocation were equal is 3,13.
2 To eliminate the possibility that the disparities between the expected and the observed number of
accused on whom the death penalty was imposed is due merely to random sampling variation
(ie, could have occurred merely by chance), a chi square statistic was computed. The value of the
statistic (Chi square = 184,12; df = 31; p < 0,005) strongly suggests that the discrepancy is not due
merely to chance variation.
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TABLE C
Imposition of the death penalty: analysis of sentencing in terms of cases
CASES IN WHICH DEATH PENALTY WAS IMPOSED*
Percentage Percentage
of cases ofjudge's
tried by Expected Observed Expected Observed individual
Judge judge number number percentage percentage case load
Col. I Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6
Baker .............. 2,24 1,80 8 2,24 10,00 44,40
Berman ............ 1,67 1,34 - 1,67 - -
Burger ............. 6,35 5,09 6 6.35 7,50 11,76
Comrie ............ 1,12 0,89 - 1,12 - -
Conradie .......... 2,24 1,80 1 2,24 1,25 5,50
Cooper ............ 0,50 0,40 - 0,50 - -
De Kock ........... 0,87 0,70 - 0,87 - -
Fagan ............. 4,11 3,30 2 4,11 2,50 6,06
Foxcroft ........... 3,74 3,00 1 3,74 1,25 3,33
Friedman .......... 1,75 1,40 1 1,75 1,25 7,14
Griessel ........... 0,12 0,09 - 0,12 - -
Hoberman ......... 0,12 0,09 - 0,12 - -
Hodes ............. 0,62 0,50 - 0,62 - -
Hofmeyr ........... 0,37 0,30 - 0,37 - -
Howie ............. 3,24 2,60 - 3,24 - -
King .............. 3,99 3,20 - 3,99 - -
Lategan ........... 8,09 6,48 17 8,09 21,25 26,10
Marais ............ 7,85 6,30 4 7,85 5,00 6,34
Munnik ........... 12,70 10,18 7 12,70 8,75 6,87
Nel ................ 3,49 2,80 7 3,49 8,75 25,00
Rose Innes ......... 10,40 8,40 1 10,40 1,25 1,20
Scott .............. 0,75 0,60 - 0,75 - -
Seligson ........... 1,12 0,90 - 1,12 - -
Selikowitz ......... 0,87 0,70 - 0,87 - -
Tebbutt ............ 5,86 4,70 4 5,86 5,00 8,51
Thring ............. 0,25 0,20 - 0,25 - -
Van den Heever .... 3,49 2,80 5 3,49 6,25 17,80
Van Heerden ...... 4,48 3,60 3 4,48 3,75 8,33
Van Schalkwyk .... 1,87 1,50 2 1,87 2,50 13,30
Viljoen ............ 0,37 0,30 - 0,37 - -
Vivier ............. 0,37 0,30 - 0,37 - -
Williamson ........ 4,98 4,00 11 4,98 13,75 27,85
Note to Table C
* Calculations arc based on the case load of individual judges and on the total number of cases in
which the death penalty was imposed.
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TABLE D
CASES ACCUSED DEATH SENTENCES
Leave to




Baker~~~~ ~ ......... r8 5 -- 1 -
E~ 0 r
Foxcroft ........ 3 2 ... 2 2 -- •-
0 4)
4- , E2 4)& U U C,
Baridman............ 14 8 is is - is -- -2
Burera .............. 517 6 9 6 1 - 4 i 36 io 8 -11 - 22 I 6 - I I
M anrai ............ 18 1 4 - 1 I - I - -. . - -- - - I
Fagni ............. 330 2 2 8 -.- 2 - 23 - - -4
Nel .......... . .. .  30 7 2 - . - - 2 2 - - 2 - - - -
rosedmne ......... 14 1 1 -- 1 I --.- - - - - - -
laebutt ............. 7 4 4 1 14 2 10 35 ... 2 2
,a . ... 63 4 4 --  1 2 4 - . I - - l
Vanni' ...d ...... 36 7 -- - 3 - 13
.0b t .  4 4 2 1 0
Van ~ ~ 0e e .... 36 4) 34,3 - - - 4, - - - - - -
Van Schalkwyk .... 15 2 3 -.- 2 1 3 -.... 3 - 2 1
Wiliamson ......... 4- S--1 18 -.- 9 9 1 -20, --.-. 1 5 12 - 7
Overall totals ...... 672 80 20 7 1 5 17 31 6 18 11 7 4G 8 23 3 5 1 17
Notes to Table D




Crime: Murder without extenuating circumstances (Case 221/86).




Crime: Murder without extenuating circumstances (Case 108/87).




Crime: Murder without extenuating circumstances (Case 139/86).




Crime: Murder without extenuating circumstances (Case 283/87).
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Crime: Murder without extenuating circumstances (Case 288/86).
6. One accused committed suicide in prison (Case 333/86).
7. The same accused was sentenced to death by two different judges in two separate cases (74/86 and
100/86). This total reflects only one of these cases.
8. Case 72/88: Rape.
9. Case 71/86: Rape




10. Case 102/86: Rape
237/87: Rape (X2)
144/88: Rape (X3).
I 1 Case 192/86: Rape.
